PERCEPTION MANAGEMENT:
BRIEF EPA HISTORY OF Sewage
Sludge biological solids -- Reclaimed Water
HAZARDOUS WASTE
Agroterrorism Agents
AND HEALTH
Jim Bynum, VP 12/16/2008
Help for Sewage Victims
Retired Safety Consultant
Since 1993 Perception Management has been used by EPA to promote the use of disease contaminated sewage
sludge as a fertilizer for farm products and as soil amendment for lawns and gardens. Perception Management is also
used to promote the use of sewage effluent as reclaimed water for use on food crops, lawns and even for flushing
toilets. Most of all Perception Management has been used to cover up bad policy decisions concerning sewage
treatment and the disposal of these sewage treatment products.
Public relations (PR) is different from Perception Management. Basically PR is used to target an audience and create a
story to appeal to an audience. On occasion public relation is used to spin the facts in a story. Generally the PR spin is
used to make a company with a serious problem appear to have a better image than it deserves. However, the facts
may be presented in a disingenuous or deceptive manner. PR is highly manipulative.
While Perception Management is also highly manipulative, the facts are created out of thin air as truths or by omission
or hidden within hundreds of pages of text.. Congress authorized government use of Perception Management in 1948
with the US Information and Educational Exchange Act (Public Law 402), better known as the Smith-Mundt Act. The
legislation authorized government sponsored propaganda for use outside the country. However, by the end of the
Vietnam War Perception Management propaganda machine was turned against the U.S. population in an effort to
manipulate public opinion to provide the desired outcome -- people would support government policies that were
against their own interest. In this case it appears to be agroterrorism.
Perception Management became important to EPA because contaminated sludge had been sold or given away since
the 1920s. Milwaukee started selling heat dried sludge in 1927. By 1945 , nineteen municipalities were selling heat
dried sludge as fertilizer. It was falsely assumed that heat drying killed all disease causing organisms in sludge. For the
wastewater industry's agricultural scientists, poisonous toxic heavy metals were simply rare earths. It was also falsely
assumed that the rare earth hexavalent chromium VI disposed of in treatment plants at 30,000 ppm was not hazardous.
It is strange but EPA could not find a treatment plant receiving more that 3,750 ppm of chromium in its 1988 National
Sewage Sludge Survey (NSSS). EPA falsely stated the court told it to take chromium out of the regulation.
When EPA employees started promoting contaminated sludge as a fertilizer for food crops and as a soil amendment for
home lawns and gardens they had to overcome a major obstacle -- they were ignoring their Federal Responsibility.
Apparently they assumed, as regulators, the federal limited Qualified Immunity would protect them as they violated the
EPA Charter and the law under TITLE 42 > CHAPTER 82 > SUBCHAPTER VI > § 6961
Federal Responsibility
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1) having jurisdiction
over any solid waste management facility or disposal site, or (2) engaged
in any activity resulting, or which may result, in the disposal or management
of solid waste or hazardous waste shall be subject to, and comply with, all
Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements, both substantive and
procedural (including any requirement for permits or reporting or any
provisions for injunctive relief and such sanctions as may be imposed by
a court to enforce such relief), respecting control and abatement of solid
waste or hazardous waste disposal and management in the same manner,
and to the same extent, as any person is subject to such requirements,
including the payment of reasonable service charges.
Qualified Immunity
What this means is that a state can not recover damages from EPA employees for promoting hazardous solid waste as
a fertilizer, even when they knowingly violate the law, nor can a state collect clean up funds when a Superfund Site is
created. However, EPA employees could be subject to criminal action for creating a fake regulation that violates the
RCRA, CERCLA and CWA.
No agent, employee, or officer of the United States shall be personally
liable for any civil penalty under any Federal, State, interstate, or
local solid or hazardous waste law with respect to any act or omission
within the scope of the official duties of the agent, employee, or
officer. An agent, employee, or officer of the United States shall be
subject to any criminal sanction (including, but not limited to, any
fine or imprisonment) under any Federal or State solid or hazardous
waste law, but no department, agency, or instrumentality of the
executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Federal Government
shall be subject to any such sanction.
In the beginning
The Ohio Cuyahoga River Fire of 1969 set the stage for the Clean Water Act of 1972. The oil slick and debris fire in
the river only last 30 minutes but it ignited a fire under the environmentalist. This was the ninth time since 1868 the
river had caught on fire. According to a Times there were not even any "sludge worms" living in the river.
In April 1970 PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION noted:
"a seven-fold increase is expected in industrial wastes produced by the large water-using industries. These wastes are
also expected to become more variable, more difficult to decompose, and more toxic. At the same time, our demand
for fresh water will increase from 350 to 800 billion gallons a day--considerably exceeding the dependable
supply of fresh water now available, some 650 billion gallons daily. More and more clean water will have to
be retrieved from progressively dirtier waterways."" Inadequacy of Present Organization. Our National
Government is neither structured nor oriented to sustain a well-articulated attack on the practices which debase the air
we breathe, the water we drink and the land that grows our food. Indeed, the present departmental structure for dealing
with environmental protection defies effective and concerted action."
Today, the sewage industry are trying to sell the public on Toilet to Tap wastewater treatment plants as reclaimed water
projects. The sad fact is wastewater treatment plants have been contaminating our surface water supply for the past 38
years under EPA and we are running out of clean drinking water. In some areas California will not permit sewage
effluent to be discharged to surface water in the dry season. Yet, current sludge and sewage reclaimed water rules do
not require the elimination of disease causing bacteria -- only a reduction for some of the deadly Family
Enterobacteriaceae: (gram negative bacteria). EPA and health officials swear to the public these bacteria (coliform) do
not cause disease and they only indicate disease organisms may be present. These are only a few bacteria that are
easy to inactivate -- not destroy. These same bacteria disposed of on farms may kill exposed young calves quickly.
California still promotes recycled sewage effluent (reclaimed water) for irrigating food crops even though disease
causing organisms are allowed by test, may survive on plants for six months, and regrow in the water distribution
systems .
It is California's position the health damage from exposure to reclaimed are outweighed by the benefits.
Recycled water irrigation projects and groundwater recharge reuse projects
provide benefits to the people of the state. These benefits include extending
the state’s limited water supply to provide water to its growing population,
reducing diversions of surface water, and reducing use of groundwater
supply. These benefits outweigh the costs associated with lowering
of water quality,
The EPA Office of Water doesn't attempt to regulate sewage reclaimed water. California is the key state in the sewage
reuse programs. Even California understands this recycled sewage water is unsafe. Why else would its permits require:
Control of incidental runoff. Incidental runoff is defined as unintended small amounts (volume) of
runoff from recycled water use areas, such as unintended, minimal over-spray from sprinklers that
escapes the recycled water use area. Water leaving a recycled water use area is not considered incidental
if it is part of the facility design, if it is due to excessive application, if it is due to intentional overflow or
application, or if it is due to negligence. Incidental runoff may be regulated by waste discharge
requirements or, where necessary, waste discharge requirements that serve as a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit, including municipal separate storm water system permits,
Management of any ponds such that no discharge occurs unless the discharge is a result of a 25-year, 24-
hour storm event or greater, and there is prior approval for the discharge by the appropriate Executive
Officer.
On the other hand the sludge rules do not require control of runoff even when the sludge is 99.5% liquid on a steep
slope 32.8 feet from surface water. It would appear the sludge experts didn't dream water runs downhill as they pump
the sludge out in streams in this North Carolina sludge dumping video.. It is hard to believe EPA calls this bulk
sewage sludge--well actually, I guess they call it biosolids.
Part 503.14(c) Bulk sewage sludge shall not be applied to agricultural land, forest, or a reclamation site
that is 10 meters or less from waters of the United States, as defined in 40 CFR 122.2, unless otherwise
specified by the permitting authority.
However, there appeared to be great hope in the 70s.
In July of 1970 Congress established the Environmental Protection agency. "EPA's [stated] mission is to protect
human health and to safeguard the natural environment—air, water, and land—upon which life depends."
In 1973, the first wastewater permit was issued: "the Indiana Stream Pollution Control Board today issued permits
approved by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to five Indiana companies for authority to discharge treated
wastewater into navigable waters" In 1974 "The Safe Drinking Water Act -- put into motion a new national program to
reclaim and ensure the purity of the water we consume. Under the Act, each level of government, every local water
system, and the individual consumer have well-defined roles and responsibilities." EPA Administrator William D.
Ruckelshaus noted, December 16, 1970 "Our hopes for this agency are high. We know all environmental problems
will not be solved this year or next. But if we remain flexible in approach and firm in our commitment, we believe we will
live up to the President's challenge that "the 1970s absolutely must be the years when America pays its debt to the
past by reclaiming the purity of its air, its water, and its living environment."
According to EPA, "During the 1970s and 1980s, the Construction Grants Program provided more than $60 billion [69
billion] for the construction of public wastewater treatment projects: sewage treatment plants, pumping stations, and
collection and intercept sewers; rehabilitation of sewer systems; and the control of combined sewer overflows." "The
most recent estimate, completed in 1996, indicates that $140 billion is needed to build and upgrade needed
municipal wastewater treatment plants in the United States and for other types of water quality improvement
projects that are eligible for funding under the Act."
The municipalities, states and the federal government claim there was no money to make this commitment and the
solution was to deregulate the whole economy and/or fake regulations such as Part 503 to lower the standards for
protecting public health. Somewhere along the line deregulation allowed the corporations to make much of the money
invested by the public disappear. Now the municipalities tax bases are disappearing so they must force toxic and
hazardous waste on the poor and/or isolated country folks because it is a less expense form of disposal and there are
not many of those folks out there. Same old crap. There is no money to protect public health, but there is plenty of
money (tax credits or bail out) for corporations who caused the health and economic problems.
Two years after Congress enacted major cradle to the grave legislation (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
1976) to protect the American public from hazardous substances (pollutants) EPA decided otherwise. Yes, EPA still
quotes that, "RCRA Subtitle C establishes a federal program to manage hazardous wastes from cradle to grave to
ensure that hazardous waste is handled in a manner that protects human health and the environment.". Yet, EPA
sludge regulators went to war over sludge in 1978 and the public lost the law's protection.
1978/79 Sludge War
By 1978 sewage sludge disposal had become a major concern for EPA's Office of Water because sludge was
considered a toxic hazardous solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. William Sanjour (retired
EPA) refers to this as the 1978/79 Sludge War. EPA Office of Water attempted to regulate sludge under the Clean
Water Act in 1978. It appears that John Walker (who first told EPA lime stabilization did not work) transferred from
USDA after 1973 to be in charge of developing the regulations for the wastewater group. In a September 12 memo
Walker said,
(Excerpt)
"Bruce Weddle''s position (stated in the attached August 28 nemo) Is that
standards promulgated for sludge disposal under 405(e) will provide
equivalent levels of environmental protection to those being developed
under RCRA. If management of wastes under Subtitle C and sludge
management under 405/4004 must be entirely equivalent and
consistent, then we cannot live with 3004—250.55-5 Land Farms,
pp. 103-111 and 250.56-2 Soil Conditioning Products. These
subsections of 3004 would essentially preclude the utilization
of sludge as a method of disposal."
The goal of 405/4004 sludge regulations should be to promote low-cost sludge
management with emphasis on minimizing risks, consumption of energy and
resources and maximizing recycling and reuse benefits, the application of some
low levels of toxic substances to land for food crop production should not be
prohibited; rather, it should be controlled by proper rates of sludge/toxic
application, soil management, etc. The potential risks of permitting some low
levels of most potentially toxic metals and persistent organics to land just have
not been demonstrated as being that great.
William Sanjour, Branch Chief
Hazardous Waste Management Division,
Memo excerpts
Since many municipal sludges would meet any reasonable definition of a
hazardous waste, I wrote a memo(3) warning of the implications of including
municipal sewage sludge in the definition of solid waste in any of the proposed
bills that were being discussed. In light of the Construction Grant Juggernaut,
we did not want to be involved in that can of worms. In that memo I concluded:
What will happen, then, if Congress gives EPA regulatory authority over hazardous
wastes? Will we have one policy for hazardous wastes which go through municipal
treatment plants and a different policy if it goes through and industrial treatment
plant? if so, we will end up in court looking like fools. Will we fail to adequately
regulate industrial wastes for fear of compromising EPA's policy on municipal sludge?
If so, we will be brought into court for failure to perform our duty.
Highly contaminated back-yard soils have now been found In Chicago, where sludge was
used as a mulch. Thousands of Chicago-area back yards have been contaminated in a
program that continued for one year following GAO 's warning to EPA. Many similar
programs are still ongoing nationwide--without restriction
Clearly there is a confrontation ahead, which can only be avoided by not getting
regulatory authority or by changing EPA sewage sludge policy
I should think that in regulating pollution which its own regulations and funds created,
EPA would apply at least the same standards as it does to pollution created by
industry. If EPA takes advantage of its position to write lesser standards for its own
pollution it will surrender the moral leadership it now commands.
By September, everyone involved recognized the futility of resisting the sludge
juggernaut -- everyone but me, that is. I was finally instructed by Gary Dietrich,
Jorling's hatchet man, to weaken the standards for land farming hazardous industrial
waste to the comfort level of the Water Office, regardless of the consequences to
human health(14) And the consequences of this cruel decision were indeed far
ranging and severe as not only sewage sludge but raw industrial hazardous waste is
"recycled" into fertilizer to this day(15). Eight days after this decision I was canned(16).
Different people handled the defeat in different ways. I became a whistleblower(17).
My ex-boss, Jack Lehman, consoled himself with the knowledge that there was a
potential medical treatment for the people we were poisoning(18). And Bob Tonetti
wrote the definitive letter to the Washington Post(19).
Congress found the EPA was not enforcing the law to protect public health and enacted even stronger legislation in
1980 with the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), to give the EPA
even more power to protect the public health and environment from "releases" of hazardous (toxic) substances into the
environment. (House Report No. 96-1016 Part 1, 1980). EPA immediately jumped on the commercial fertilizer exclusion
in the CERCLA for distributing hazardous waste (sludge) as a fertilizer..
The EPA began promoting the use of all sewage sludges (including those contaminated by pathogens) as beneficial
use fertilizers. And, in 1980, "The Agency decided that growth of food-chain crops need not be banned at hazardous
waste land treatment facilities but rather should be carefully regulated." (3) By 1983, the EPA decided,
"-- to avoid conceivable stigmatization, we are willing to re-name recycled hazardous wastes "regulated recyclable
materials." (4) And, in 1985, the "regulated recyclable materials" title was shortened to "recyclable material"." (5) Not
only that, but "--commercial hazardous waste derived fertilizers would not have to undergo chemical bonding to be
exempt." from the law. (6)
Not only that, but who could have imagined that the toxic liquid landfill leachate would be dumped into wastewater
treatment plants and become part of EPA's biosolds fertilizer. The greatest shock was to find that EPA was cleaning up
toxic and hazardous radioactive superfund sites by running the material through wastewater treatment sites such as the
Lowry superfund radioactive site in Denver. Since treatment plants do not decontaminate the material, the radioactive
material passed through the treatment plant and was concentrated in the sludge effluent or was released in the
wastewater effluent to surface water.
It would be ten years before the sludge regulation resurfaced in 1989 as the proposed 40 CFR 257 et.al., (Part 503)
The focus would be to dump sludge into the most dangerous and fragile part of our environment as a nonpoint source
of pollution. EPA's sludge regulators started the attack on the environment by statement (EPA report SW905, 1981),
and by official policy (EPA report WH-595, 1984) as Congress was enacting the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments. USDA, FDA, and the US Public Health Service all signed off on the official policy in 1981.
Yet, Congress had made itself very clear in Sec. 6901(7) certain classes of land disposal facilities are not
capable of assuring long-term containment of certain hazardous wastes, and to avoid substantial risk to
human health and the environment, reliance on land disposal should be minimized or eliminated, and land
disposal, particularly landfill and surface impoundment, should be the least favored method for managing
hazardous wastes.
(3) as a result of the Clean Air Act [42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.], the Water Pollution Control Act [33 U.S.C.
1251 et seq.], and other Federal and State laws respecting public health and the environment, greater
amounts of solid waste (in the form of sludge and other pollution treatment residues) have been created.
Similarly, inadequate and environmentally unsound practices for the disposal or use of solid waste have
created greater amounts of air and water pollution and other problems for the environment and for health;
The Part 503 Sludge Use and Disposal guideline is only part of EPA's dangerous Disposal program.
EPA's policy allows extreme levels of hazardous waste to be disposed of without public involvement, In 1989 memo to
William K. Reilly, Administrator concerning the clean up of Boston Harbor, William Sanjour and Hugh B. Kaufman said,
In trying to con the public into accepting the landfill, the environmental impact statement prepared by the EPA
regional office contains such egregious statements as:
- Escape of leachate to the soil beneath the lined area should not be expected for a properly operated and
maintained double-lined landfill that is capped after filling of each cell.
- The occurrence of an undetected and thus, unrepaired, leak in the proposed Walpole MCI landfill liner system
would be unlikely.
- ... there would be sufficient time for such a leak to be detected and corrective action to be taken.
- ... any leak which did occur in the landfill liner could be quickly repaired...
- A properly designed and executed monitoring plan would detect any landfill leaks in sufficient time to remediate
any groundwater contamination before significant impacts occurred...
The scientific consensus of the sludge regulators and industry was/is to make the landfill regulations so restrictive that
the sludge industry would gladly go along with creating nonpoint source sewage dumping grounds out of our farmland
and gardens as well as parks and school grounds. This would carry over into the landfill section of Part 503.23 which is
extremely restrictive. Much of beneficial use sludge would not be allowed within 150 meters of the landfill boundary.
The EPA Journal of April, 1984 reported that "National studies suggest that agricultural nonpoint source pollution
adversely affects portions of over two-thirds of the nation's river basins." According to the article: About 63 percent of
non-federal land in the United States is used for agricultural purposes, including crop and livestock
production. It is not surprising, therefore, that agricultural activities constitute the most pervasive cause of water
quality problems from nonpoint sources. Indeed, it is considered the most serious cause in most EPA regions."
The Congressional Research Service Report RL30022 states, "Prior to the 1987 amendments, programs in the Clean
Water Act were primarily directed at point source pollution, wastes discharged from discrete and identifiable sources,
such as pipes and other outfalls. In contrast, except for general planning activities, little attention had been given
to nonpoint source pollution (stormwater runoff from agricultural lands, forests, construction sites, and
urban areas), despite estimates that it represents more than 50% of the nation's remaining water pollution
problems. As it travels across land surface towards rivers and streams, rainfall and snowmelt runoff picks up
pollutants, including sediments, toxic materials, and conventional wastes (e.g., nutrients) that can degrade water
quality."
The January 26, 1998 issue of SLUDGE reported that Kansas City, Missouri violated NPDES permit requirements at
its 1,200 acre sludge application site. There was a 100,000 gallon sludge spill from a broken pipe at the site as well as
ground water contamination from high levels of nitrogen, aluminum, arsenic, and fecal coliform. The state and EPA
hardly comment on the violation.
Now EPA uses the agricultural stormwater runoff exclusion in the CWA as justification for sludge use as a fertilizer even
though:
"The 1987 amendments authorized measures to address such pollution by directing states to develop and
implement nonpoint pollution management programs (section 319 of the Act). States were encouraged to
pursue groundwater protection activities as part of their overall nonpoint pollution control efforts. Federal financial
assistance was authorized to support demonstration projects and actual control activities. These grants may cover up
to 60% of program implementation costs."
EPA found it had a serious legal and public relations problem. It had been promoting sewage sludge as a nonpoint
source of pollution (fertilizer) for the past six years. EPA had ignored the facts included in the environmental laws:
- RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (RCRA): Sludge generated from a municipal or industrial
wastewater treatment plant is a solid waste. Due to the concentration of physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics sludge is a hazardous waste.
Disregarding fertilizers manufactured from hazardous waste, the CERCLA, Public Law 96-510, was
primarily designed to close the loopholes in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to
protect the public and environment from a release of hazardous substances (pollutants) from
inactive hazardous waste sites. (House Report 96-1016, May 16, 1980)
- CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA): Due to physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics sludge is a pollutant;. Any
combination of solid waste, sewage, sewage sludge, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials
makes it a toxic pollutant .
According to EPA in 1993:
"The term "toxic pollutant" is not used in the final 1993 part 503 regulation because this generally is limited
to the list of priority toxic pollutants developed by EPA. The Agency concluded that Congress intended
that EPA develop the part 503 pollutant limits for a broader range of substances that might interfere with
the use and disposal of sewage sludge, not just the 126 priority pollutants." (FR. 58, 32, p. 9327)"
EPA had another serious problem, "According to Senate Report No. 199-431, there were serious problems with ocean
dumping of sludge at the 12 mile site off New York City and the same problems occurred when ocean dumping was
moved to the 106 mile site. The adverse impacts at the site the report documented were:
Bacterial contamination and closure of shellfish areas;
elevated levels of toxic metals and organohalogens in
bottom sediments in and near the site including known
fishing areas and within five nautical miles of coastal
beaches; community changes (decreases) in relative
abundance and diversity of species; sublethal toxicity
effects in economically valuable species;
bioaccumulation of certain metals and organohalogens in
fish and shellfish.
Furthermore, according to the Senate Report:
With the onset of large scale dumping of sewage sludge
at the 106 mile site in 1987, fishermen began to
complain of significant decreases in catches and
incidences of diseased fish which were previously not
found at these depths. Some of the diseased fish have a
shell disease which is associated with sewage sludge and
pollution in coastal waters. This disease was found
around the 12 mile site.
According to the Senate Report, "Scientists are just
beginning to explore the impacts that sludge dumping may be
having on marine resources in the area potentially effected
by sludge dumping at the 12 mile site."
Nine years later the EPA would drag the National Research Council (NRC) Committee into its Perception Management
program to detoxify sludge with the 1996 report "Use of Reclaimed Water and Sludge in Food Crop Production"
the report suggested that the ocean dumping ban was a
result of a public perception problem, "The public reaction
in 1988 to the appearance of medical wastes along New
Jersey shores (Spector, 1992) led to the enactment of the
Ocean Dumping Act (P.L. 100-68) that included a ban on
ocean dumping of sewage sludge." (p. 152)
The NRC Committee quoted a New York Times reporter,
as a scientist. The June 29, 1992 article was titled,
"New York ending ocean dumping, but not problems."
However, before the Perception Management program was created. In 1989, it appears Bruce Weddle did attempt to
create a legitimate regulation in 1978 under the Clean Water Act for the use and disposal of sludge. It appeared to be
very conservative until you saw the list of hazardous substances as I noted in the 1992 peer reviewed (well it was
reviewed by University of New Mexico School of Law) paper, Sludge Disposal: Sanitary Landfill--Open Dump--
Superfund Site:
"The paper concludes that sludge can not be safely disposed of on farmland because: 1) only 28 out of 400 toxic
pollutants are proposed for regulation; 2) 15 out of 25 toxic inorganics on the superfund list are not included;
and 3) Thirty-three pollutants considered hazardous for land disposal are not included."
In 1993, EPA said, "The decision not to regulate does not necessarily mean that the unregulated pollutants may not
threaten public health and the environment" (58 FR 9384). In 2004, nothing had changed, EPA's Robert Bastian and
James Smith said, "Concerns raised over emerging pathogens and chemicals for which little or no data are available
tend to be put off for future consideration when more adequate data are generated." In a 2005 study Sources of
Pathogenic Microorganisms and Their Fate during Land Application of Wastes , Charles P. Gerba* and James
E. Smith, reported bacteria could live in the soil for a year and on plants for six months. They also say, "The hazards
associated with pathogens in land-applied animal and human wastes have long been recognized."
The release of the proposed regulation was based on a Court Opinion that EPA could not authorize pollution credits to
companies dumping pollutants into sewage treatment plants without a sludge use and disposal regulation in place. In
the proposed regulation Weddle did not try to spin the facts. Weddle acknowledged EPA had little or no data on most
chemicals to establish a safe level.
Moreover Weddle listed 21 chemicals known to be carcinogens in sewage sludge. Weddle apparently had little data on
the 25 primary pathogens it listed in sewage sludge. The implication was most of the primary pathogens simply caused
a stomach upset --gastroenteritis (diarrhea and vomiting). There was one more major problem with crop restrictions. No
farmer could wait the minimum 14 months required to harvest crops.
§ 503.32(5)(b) Site restrictions.
(i) Food crops with harvested parts that touch the sewage
sludge/soil mixture and are totally above the land surface
shall not be harvested for 14 months after application of
sewage sludge.
(ii) Food crops with harvested parts below the surface of the
land shall not be harvested for 20 months after application
of sewage sludge when the sewage sludge remains on the land
surface for four months or longer prior to incorporation into the soil.
(iii) Food crops with harvested parts below the surface of the
land shall not be harvested for 38 months after application of
sewage sludge when the sewage sludge remains on the land
surface for less than four months prior to incorporation into the soil.
By the time the regulation was released in 1993, EPA dropped the time restrictions to 30 days by adding food crops to
the feed crops and fiber crop harvesting restrictions. A little Perception Management here. While Alan Rubin claimed
this new section was for crops not addressed above, according to Part 503 the term food is all inclusive "Food crops
are crops consumed by humans. These include, but are not limited to, fruits, vegetables, and tobacco."
(iv) Food crops, feed crops, and fiber crops shall not be harvested for 30 days after application of
sewage sludge.
EPA's committee to peer review the Part 503 regulation was composed of people who had been involved with sludge
and developing the regulation for a very long time. Most claimed to be metal bioavailability experts including James
Ryan who would be the co-author of the revised regulation. Only one claimed to have any expertise on pathogens.
The conflict of interest were astounding. The Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies (AMSA) and the Water
Environment Federation (WEF) contributed to travel expenses (58 FR 9267). The AMSA and the WEF membership are
composed of wastewater treatment plant management, engineering companies, equipment suppliers, waste
management industry, etc.
The first step in their effort to gut the 1989 proposed regulation was for the Peer Review Committee to attack the
lack of science behind the regulation. They wrote:
It is evident from a review of the document that many of
the conclusions reached by EPA are not driven by
science, but rather by policy decisions. In view of the
inherent uncertainties in risk assessment and the
necessity for value judgements, the prominence of the
policy decisions is understandable. However, instead of
acknowledging these policy decisions and justifying them
on legal, political and social grounds, EPA has in many
cases, tried to make it appear that the basis for these
decisions was scientific. This problem permeates the
proposed rule and technical support documents.---we wish
to emphasize that EPA has disguised policy decisions
with the risk assessment assumptions and database,
apparently to make it appear that the results were
derived scientifically. Had they wished to do the effort
correctly they should have, at the very least, clearly
presented the underlying assumptions, data and models.
Instead, these are scattered through numerous documents
in a manner that is very difficult to assess.
Of course, the purpose of the regulation was to get rid of the sludge problem, not regulate it. Basically, many
sludge disposal sites could have already exceeded the proposed regulated limits. One of the recommendations of the
Peer Review Committee which would help to increase the beneficial use of sludge was to * Develop the concept of a
"clean sludge" which allows minimal regulation. In other words, the Peer Review Committee wanted to make it
easy for the POTWs by not requiring any additional paperwork. Any paperwork would draw attention to the product
and the toxic contents. Paperwork would also allow tracking of the product for liability purposes. Clean in this case only
means there is a little less of some of the toxic metals in the products.
Another recommendation of the Peer Review Committee was:
* "Not regulate all D&M (distributing and marketing) products as a sludge. In effect, take the labeling requirements off,
so the public will not know they are buying this toxic and extremely hazardous material."
It happened but it was not a good idea. Original EPA research on sludge for distributing and marketing sludge revealed
that little was known about chemicals in sludge and there were serious concerns about pathogen regrowth for the few
sludge samples tested.
"The only way the Peer Committee could change the regulation was to attack the methodology behind the regulation.
Although the Technical Support Documents (TSDs) had been reviewed and approved by the Science Advisory Board
in 1987, which was composed of some of the same members as the Peer Review Committee, the Committee criticized
the regulations as containing: Such extensive misinterpretation and errors in the TSDs that it is imperative that EPA
review and revise them completely. We also recommend that review and revision of the rule and the TSDs be
conducted in consultation with the PRC (Peer Review Committee) and other knowledgeable experts. What was worse,
in their view, was that beneficial use would be effectively prohibited under the new rule"
The major problem EPA faced was removing sewage sludge from the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act's
(RCRA) solid waste Part 257 to the Clean Water Act (CWA). Part 257 now controls sludge use and disposal from
industrial treatment plants. However, there was a caveat for the states: "EPA's role in the management of industrial
nonhazardous Waste [sludge] is very limited. Under RCRA Subtitle D, EPA issued minimal criteria prohibiting "open
dumps" (40 CFR 257) in 1979. The states, not EPA, are responsible for implementing the "open dumping criteria," and
EPA has no back-up enforcement role." (FR. 62, 19, p. 4284, January 29, 1997)
Instead of having one use and disposal sludge rule under the RCRA, EPA created two a additional regulations under
the amended RCRA and CWA. The first regulation was issued in 1991 as 40 CFR 257 et al -- (Part 258 Municipal
sludge co-disposal landfill regulation -- CRITERIA FOR MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE LANDFILLS). It was very strict for
sludge.
The states were charged with doing a risk assessment for the regulated chemicals. The regulation established that this
"minimum national criteria ensure the protection of human health and the environment." Landfills that didn't comply
with the criteria " violate sections 309 and 405(e) of the Clean Water Act" and "constitute open dumps, which are
prohibited under section 4005 of RCRA." Moreover, "Owners or operators of all MSWLF units must prevent or control
on-site populations of disease vectors" such as "rodents, flies, mosquitoes, or other animals, including insects,
capable of transmitting disease to humans."
Furthermore, they shall not "Cause a discharge of pollutants into waters of the United States, including wetlands," or
"Cause the discharge of a nonpoint source of pollution to waters of the United States, including wetlands" The
regulation lists 62 Constituents for Detection Monitoring out of a List of 220 Hazardous Inorganic and Organic
Constituents It also offered some protection for ground water: "The design must ensure that the concentration values
listed in Table 1 of this section (24 chemicals) will not be exceeded in the uppermost aquifer at the relevant point of
compliance"
The most important section of Part 258 is "The owner or operator of a municipal solid waste landfill unit must comply
with any other applicable Federal rules, laws, regulations, or other requirements." On the other hand doesn't includge
any protective wording and Part 503.4 states,
Disposal of sewage sludge in a municipal solid waste landfill unit, as defined in 40 CFR 258.2, that
complies with the requirements in 40 CFR part 258 constitutes compliance with section 405(d) of the
CWA.
Under Part 503, there is no requirement for anyone to comply with any federal rule or law as it is in part 258. Part 503
appears to be the only regulation whose purpose does not include minimum standards to protect public health and the
environment.
There is an interesting question as to who wrote the Part 503 regulation. Walker indicated that Bruce Weddle
wrote the regulation. On the other hand, Alan Rubin (retired) claimed to have wrote the regulation during the time he
appeared to be in charge of the program. However, it must be remembered the sludge section of the Office of Water is
kind of like the Wizard of Oz. When they evoke the name of EPA, there is hardly anybody there. In 2002 the EPA OIG
reported there were only 4 full time employees at Headquarters in the sludge program and 1.6 employees in
Research and Development. Oh, lets not forget the 2/10s of an employee in Legal and zero employees in
Enforcement and Compliance Assurance.
We have to wonder which of the 1.6 employees in Research and Development talked to EPA microbiologist David Lewis
when he wrote the article Sludge Magic at the EPA for The Journal of Commerce; January 27, 1999
Lewis wrote
According to scientists working for the Environmental Protection Agency's Office of
Research & Development, the Sludge Rule on land application of municipal wastes (40
CFR Part 503) promulgated in 1993 may be the most scientifically unsound action ever
taken by the agency. Rather than being protective, the rule actually threatens public
health and the environment.
Lewis even checked with the lab that did the soil test reports on our family farm and said:
Disease-causing microorganisms that can lie dormant or proliferate in soil treated with
sludge are even more disconcerting to microbiologists. Samples taken this year from land
[Alice Minter Trust farm] in north Kansas City contained 650,000 salmonella and E. coli
bacteria per 100 grams of soil -many thousands of times higher that what is considered
safe by public health officials. The source, apparently, was sludge applied in the area
before 1992.
EPA's Regional Office actually promised the state it would do the test and then backed out. After we did the testing,
EPA, the state and Kansas City officials swore the sludge disposal site complied with all the laws and regulations.
However, the public record told a different story. The sludge contractor Nutri-jet had been fired by Kansas City, Missouri
for applying excessive amounts of sludge at its sludge site. Nutri-Jet was represented In 1995 on the EPA's Biosolids
Public Acceptance Subcommittee which was created and entrusted with a two-fold task...to gain public acceptance of
sludge use and to convince states to accept delegation, that is, to take responsibility for administering the Part 503 rule.
The problem in Missouri was that the Department of Natural Resources (DNR) had more statutory power than the
Department of Health. The Department of Health could not investigate unless invited to do so by the DNR, or so the
Director of the Department of Health informed me.
It would appear that there were not enough sludge experts at EPA to even revise the regulation to a lower standard.
The question facing EPA's BURNELL VINCENT in a 1992 memo as he waited "for Ryan [EPA] and Chaney' s [USDA]
rewrite" of the part 503 regulation was, "Are human health and the environment "pretty safe" with the application rates
drafted, or does the Administrator need to hear that major work is necessary just to be pretty safe? Can we feel OK as
long as the uncertainty is fully discussed, both in the preamble and the guidance documents?"
EPA published the final Part 503 Sludge Use and Disposal regulation as 40 CFR 257 et al., in the Federal Register,
February 19, 1993. However, it was based on exclusions in the environmental laws:
- RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT: while solid waste'' means sludge from a waste
treatment plant, it does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage [in pipeline to
treatment plant] (Domestic sewage exclusion).
- In a letter dated Feb. 7, 1986, to the Honorable Thomas P. O'Neil, Jr., Speaker. U.S. House of
Representatives, EPA said, "The Domestic Sewage Exclusion, (specified in Section 1004(27) of RCRA)
provides that a hazardous waste, when mixed with domestic sewage is no longer considered hazardous.
Therefore, POTW's receiving hazardous waste in this manner are not subject to the RCRA treatment,
storage and disposal facility requirements. The premise behind the Domestic Sewage Exclusion is that
RCRA management of wastes within a POTW is unnecessary and redundant since these wastes are
regulated under the Clean Water Act's regulatory programs."
EPA claimed "This is a key definition, because the standards in the part 503 regulation apply to sewage
sludge generated during the treatment of domestic sewage in a treatment works. When domestic sewage
is in the influent to a treatment works, even if the influent also contains industrial wastewater, sewage
sludge is generated during the treatment of the domestic sewage." (FR. 58, p. 9326 - 40 CFR 257 et al.)
However, that is not the complete truth as Martha G. Prothro, Director, Permits Division (EN-336) explained in a
September 11, 1986 memo. She said,
For example, wastewater treatment sludge from the chemical conversion coating of aluminum is a listed
hazardous waste in the RCRA regulations. If this waste is sent to a POTW via a sewer where the
waste mixes with domestic sewage prior to reaching the POTW's treatment plant, then the waste would be
covered by the domestic sewage exemption, and therefore would not subject the POTW to a RCRA
permit. If, however, the same waste is trucked directly to the POTW, then the waste would still be
considered "hazardous waste" and the POTW would be required to have a RCRA permit to accept such
waste.
EPA claimed "If the placement of sludge on land were considered to be "the normal application of
fertilizer," that placement could not give rise to liability under CERCLA." (Comprehensive Environmental
Response and Liability Act) --- "Under CERCLA, protection from liability is also provided when there is a
release of a CERCLA hazardous substance and the release occurs pursuant to Federal authorization.
Thus under CERCLA, in defined circumstances, the application of sewage sludge to land in compliance
with a permit required by section 405 of the Clean Water Act is a Federally permitted release as defined in
CERCLA." ---"Consequent, releases of hazardous substances from the land application of sewage
authorized under and in compliance with an NPDES permit would constitute a Federally permitted release."
(FR. 58, p. 9262 - 40 CFR 257 et al.)
To make this work EPA claimed to assume the responsibility for issuing sludge use permits required under
Section 405 of the CWA. (F.R. 58, p.9412). States would have to apply for approval to issue permits
under the federal NPDES program since no state had ever applied for approval of a solid waste
management plan required under Part 256. EPA knew it was impossible to handle the required 20,000
permit applications within the 120 day requirement and used that as an excuse to release Part 503 as a
self-permitting regulation for open dumping. EPA encourages the 43 unapproved states to issue permits
as "a permit can provide a partial "Permit as a shield" defense for compliance with the permit (Part 122.25
(a)(2)." (F.R. 58, p.9408)
The sludge generator (treatment plant) is the responsible permitted party, even if the sludge is disposed of in another
state. EPA wanted to make sure the industry understood the concept:
"When sewage sludge is not used to condition the soil or to fertilize crops or vegetation grown on the
land, the sewage sludge is not being land applied. It is been disposed of on the land. In that case, the
requirements in the subpart on surface disposal in the final part 503 must be met." (FR. 58, 32, p. 9330)
- CLEAN WATER ACT: while point source of pollution means any discharge to water from any source,
This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges
According to Ken Arnold of the Missouri DNR, stormwater runoff from the Kansas City sludge site is a
federal, not a state problem. In a letter dated December 18, 1997, he states: The Kansas City Birmingham
permit does not require monitoring or limitations of the storm water runoff from the agricultural crop land
fields where biosolids (sludge) are being spread at beneficial use rates. Storm water runoff from these
agricultural crop fields is considered a non-point source under State rules as is the storm water runoff from
agricultural fields where commercial fertilizers and pesticides are applied. The storm water runoff onto the
Alice Minter Trust property is from an agricultural crop land field where biosolids are subsurface injected
into the soil at beneficial use rates. The potential impact of this storm water runoff onto the adjacent farm
land would need to be addressed under the federal rules at 40 CFR 503.
Actually, photos show Kansas City was spraying sludge into the air.
There were several major problems with Part 503:
- "EPA concluded that adequate protection of public health and the environment did not require the
adoption of standards designed to protect human health or the environment under exposure conditions
that are unlikely and where effects were not significant or widespread." (FR. 58, p. 9252)
- The safety of sludge biosolids is based only on partial inactivating fecal coliform bacteria. Fecal coliform
are the mutant thermotolerant strains of the very dangerous pathogenic Enterobacteriaceae (coliform)
family of enteric bacteria. E. coli and Salmonella are two members of the coliform family.
- EPA acknowledges that exposure to a pollutant (pathogens - chemicals) through contact, the air, water or
food-chain, "-- could, on the basis of information available to the Administrator of EPA, cause death,
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (including
malfunction in reproduction), or physical deformations in either organisms [people] or offspring [children]
of the organisms [people]." FR. 58, 32, p. 9389 - part 503.9(t)
- EPA has said, "...If sewage sludge containing high levels of pathogenic organisms (e.g.,viruses, bacteria)
or high concentrations of pollutants is improperly handled, the sludge could contaminate the soil, water,
crops, livestock, fish and shellfish" ( FR. 58, 32, p.9258).
EPA actually refers to the Part 503 Surface Disposal section as a sludge only landfill or mono-fill.
- Not only that, but "Sewage sludge with high concentrations of certain organic and metal pollutants may
pose human health problems when disposed of in sludge only landfills (often referred to as mono-fills) or
simply left on the land surface, if the pollutants leach from the sludge into ground water. Therefore, the
pollutant concentrations may need to be limited or other measures such as impermeable liner's must be
taken to ensure the ground water is not contaminated" (FR. 58, 32, p.9259)
- As published, Part 503.13 Chromium in beneficial use sludge was limited to................. 3000ppm
There is no limit now, but
Removal credits for chromium disposed of as beneficial use sludge is now 100,000 ppm
The Hazardous waste level is 5 ppm
- Under part 503.23, only the least dangerous sewage sludge may be disposed of in a sanitary landfill, that
is sludge with less than 73 ppm of Arsenic, 600 ppm of chromium and 420 ppm of Nickel. (40 CFR
503.23, Table 1)
- Part 503 is even more restrictive within 25 meters of a surface disposal sanitary landfill boundary.
The pollutant concentrations must be less than 30 ppm of Arsenic, 200 ppm of Chromium and 210
ppm of Nickel. (40 CFR 503.23, Table 2)
As noted above, the states quickly picked up on EPA's Perception Management program that was put into effect
because the states are responsible for solid waste management, and since sludge is a solid waste, the states are
responsible for preventing these pathogen and chemical contaminated solid waste open dumps on farmland under the
RCRA. Since EPA knew sludge use could cause harm to public health and the environment, this appears to meet the
definition of agroterrorism.
According to R.M. Goodrich, et al., Agroterrorism in the U.S.: An Overview: "Agroterrorism is the deliberate introduction
of detrimental agents, biological and otherwise, into the agricultural and food processing system with the intent of
causing actual or perceived harm." Perhaps EPA didn't think the farmers would notice. Goodrich said, "Even without
agroterrorism, livestock disease costs the U.S. economy about $17.5 billion and crop diseases account for about $30
billion."
Either we have had a serious agroterrorism attack the government didn't tell us about or the government is
responsibility for what looks like an agroterrorism attack. The government reported there were only 2 million cases of
foodborne illnesses in 1986. By1999 there was 38 times as many illnesses. (Mead,et.al) (CDC) estimates
there are only about 76 million foodborne cases annually, 325,000 Hospitalized and 5,000 deaths.
CDC still uses these figures = 6.3 million illnesses per month, 27,000 people hospitalized each month, 416 dead each
month. No one in government wants you to know what it is today.
What the EPA knew
Perception Management was the only option for EPA if there was to be any chance that local governments, the public
and farmers would accept sewage sludge use. EPA had to create facts out of thin air as truths and lie. It had too much
to overcome. In 1973 USDA's John Walker reported to Conference co-chair EPA's Jim Smith that studies confirmed
that stabilization of sludge with lime at pH 11-12 was only effective for inactivating Salmonella for approximately 30
days. USDA's John Walker noted once the pH dropped back to normal , bacteria recovered to original levels.
In "Interfacing with the Real World" (2004), EPA's Robert Bastian and Jim Smith mentioned. "An important
conclusionfrom the 1973 conference was that "unless political and institutional constrains on land application of
effluents and sludges are recognized, identified, and resolved, projects will likely fail, regardless of their technical,
scientific, and economic feasibility" (National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, 1973)".
The constraints included:
In 1985 Dr. J. Babish and associates at Cornell's College of Agriculture and Life Sciences in their study "Health risks
associated with the organic fraction of municipal sewage sludges." reported mice were killed quickly by the
organic fraction of sludge. This happened even when tests indicated the sludge was nontoxic.
While the mice exhibited central nervous system damage (neurological damage) shortly after being dosed, it would
appear what EPA focused on in the study was the fact that "there was no documentable physical evidence indicated in
the bodies to support the cause of death for the mice. In effect, a doctor would have said these mice died of natural
causes."
There was a two prong attack to convince state legislators, regulators, farmers and the public that sludge was safe.
The public relations firm Powell Tate (Jody Powell (D) and Sheila Tate (R)) with ties to the Whitehouse was hired to
create a "national communications plan for the promotion of land application." They found that when the term sludge
biological solids was shortened to Biosolids it was accepted much better than sludge, which had a negative image. A
main finding was that biosolids had to appear to be a different product than sludge, such as a naturally recyclable
resource.
The purpose of the plan was to gain worldwide acceptance of toxic sludge as a fertilizer by local governments, farmers,
and the public (us) by the year 2000. In 1995 John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton, authors of Toxic Sludge Is Good
For You, said their research "revealed a murky tangle of corporate and government bureaucracies, conflicts of
interest, and a coverup of massive hazards to the environment and human health."
The EPA also immediately went to the National Academy of Science's (NAS), National Research Council (NRC)
Committee to scientifically deal with the priority Perception Management issue, "the public health perception issues
associated with the toxic sludge used in the production of crops for human consumption." The NRC Committee Chair,
Dr. Albert L. Page, was none other than the Co-chair of the Part 503 Peer Review committee. However, Dr. Page said,
"The committee was not constituted to conduct an independent risk assessment of possible health effects, but
instead to review the method and procedures used by EPA in its extensive risk assessment, which was the basis
for the Part 503 Sludge Rule."
You knew the outcome since the sponsors of the report were the EPA, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, the USDA, the
FDA, the National Water Research Institute, the Water Environment Research Foundation, the National Food
Processors Association, the Association of Metropolitan Sewerage Agencies, California's Eastern Municipal Water
District, the Metropolitan Water Districts of Southern California, Bio Gro Division of Wheelabrator Water Technologies,
and N-Viro International Corporation.
The public perception issues reviewed included: (1) transmission of infectious diseases from the use
of sludge on food crops, (2) scientific evidence to prove sludge was safe for use on food crops, (3)
government regulations to protect the public health from the use of untreated sewage sludge or
mishandling of sewage sludge on food crops.
The NAS Committee based their premise that sludge was safe for use on crops on the assumption
that: (1)the EPA's risk assessment was accurate, (2) the federal regulations were the laws, (3) the
regulated procedures would be followed to the letter, (4) the treatment process and equipment
would consistently produce the same quality of sludge, (5) there were no scientifically documented
outbreaks of infectious diseases from the use of sludge on crops.
According to the report, the rationale for the literary review was the EPA's concern with the "food
processing industry's reluctance to accept the practice"
It is highly unusual that a scientific body would attempt to influence the food industry, by concluding
that sludge was safe for use on food crops, without a complete investigation of the pollutants in
crops grown on sludge amended soils.
Co-author Michael Baram, a professor of public health law at the Boston University School of Public Health, one of the
14 authors of the report, disagrees with the reports conclusion, not for the misstatements of facts on the
federal regulations or law, but for the infectious disease aspects. Dr. Baram said, "It's a main weakness of the report
that it did not probe sufficiently into the infectious disease aspects... We spent most of our time just determining if the
EPA used risk-analysis that met professional standards." Baram had good reason to be concerned. "the NRC report
found, "Many of the variables associated with the transmission of infectious disease from wastewater and sludge are
either not well understood or are unpredictable."
It is clear that EPA did not meet professional standards. In the preamble to Part 503 "EPA concluded that adequate
protection of public health and the environment did not require the adoption of standards designed to protect human
health or the environment under exposure conditions that are unlikely and where effects were not significant or
widespread." Affects on one farm and its neighbors are not significant or widespread compared to the general
population. It was EPA's position in 1989 that most of the 25 primary pathogens listed in the original Part 503 only
caused gastroenteritis. Of course we now know this short list of pathogens cause Diseases of heart (heart disease),
Malignant neoplasms (cancer), Cerebrovascular diseases (stroke), Chronic lower respiratory diseases, blood
poisoning, and other diseases and deaths.
Apparently EPA did not furnish the NRC Committee a copy of the official 1995 book, A Guide to the Biosolids Risk
Assessments for the EPA Part 503 Rule -- EPA832-B-93-005 before the NRC report was released in 1996.
Three of the authors were John Walker who first told us liming sludge did not kill Salmonella twenty years earlier as well
as EPA's James Ryan and USDA's Rufus Chaney who rewrote the Part 503 omitting references to hazardous toxic
chemicals and disease organisms in sludge. The 144 page book claims the purpose of the risk assessment is to
"assess the potential for risk to humans, other animals, and plants from pollutants in bisolids." However, the authors
falsely claimed the toxic heavy metals in sludge were considered noncarcinogens "(they do not cause or induce
cancer) for the [14] exposure pathways evaluated."
It would appear EPA's risk assessment did not consider that anyone had to take a breath while working on a sludge
site as it removed all references to the original 503 document that showed the five toxic heavy metals that are
carcinogens when inhaled. Not only that, but according to EPA,the sludge health risk assessment was only based on
looking at 13 organic chemicals which were either already banned, no longer manufactured or restricted for use. These
were dropped from consideration in the rule. Strange -- there were 14 organic chemicals listed that caused cancer in
the original 503 document. Of course there was no way to do a risk assessment for disease causing organisms when
EPA knew that bacteria could survive in soil for one year and on plants for six months. Spore forming bacteria and
viruses could survive for years or centuries.
It would take years for us to discover how much damage reclaimed sewage water could do when used on food
crops. Yes, there are 12,000 acres in the Salinas Valley of California irrigated with reclaimed sewage effluent which has
been linked to spinach and lettuce disease outbreaks. Retired Soil Scientist, Frank Pecarich, discussed this in an
article titled Deadly Pathogens and Science vs. PR and Politics: Spinach in Monterey County
In 1994 EPA took the Perception Management program to the next step. According to a memo from EPA's Robert E.
Lee to John Walker and Robert Bastian, dated Oct. 17, 1994, at least part of the 1. 2 million dollars given to the Water
Environmental Federation (WEF) (association of sludge disposal interests) for use in EPA's public relations campaign
to debunk the horror stories associated with sewage sludge use is EPA 104 funding, which actually restricted funding
to..."establish national programs for the prevention, reduction, and elimination of pollution."
The money was to be used for:
- Odor Control Manual
- Sludge Horror Stories
- Biosolids Technical Assessments
- Management of Class B
- Arid Lands
- PCB's in Biosolids
- One with a Water Shed Twist
- Maybe more for wetlands work in water sheds
In a 12/29/1994 memo to the Water Environment Federation titled Candidates for the Rest of the Story,
John Walker offered the name of a Potential WEF Writer/Cordinator for this Effort. The effort included:
1) Merco/NY biosolids expose' -- TV nations Production
2) Linda Zander case -- sick and dead cattle -- worker health
3) Miami-Dade County biosolids causing loss of papaya tees on 100 acres of land. -- $7 million dollar settlement
4) Pending Prime Time TV story on Torres Martinez -- corrupt contractor -- biosolids mountain
5) Tree kill in Washington State with King Co. METRO biosolids on Weyerhauser land.
6) Miniature horse deaths in Oklahoma
7) Bioaersols -- claim for 2 to 5 mile barrier in NYC
8) Banker Liability Concerns
9) Pathogen regrowth during shipment -- MERCO -- "inconsistencies in the sampling and analytical methods at the
five separate labs conducting the analysis."
10) Biosolids a cause of AIDS
11) Biosolids used on ballfields causing Lou Gehrig's disease
12) Maryland turf grass loss due to biosolids -- involved grower's use of highway roller on his fields
13) Raleigh, NC -- dead cattle from nitrate poisoning due to forage with high nitrate content. -- forage was not mixed
with other low-nitrate fodder as advised by POTW
14) BLM policy opposing use of biosolids on Federal lands: equating it use with hazardous waste dumping and
landfilling raising SUPERFUND liability concerns
15) Citizens Irate over purchase of farmland for biosolids use
Other possible cases
According to a second memo to WEF's Nancy Blatt and Tim Williams the target audience for Perception Management
program are municipalities, contractors, WEF spokespersons, other wastewater professionals and maybe the public.
These were the people to get the authoritative story out to the public since regulators and municipalities didn't have
much credibility with the public. Walker also suggested the stories should be written up differently for different
audiences so the work or the write could "make a positive difference with respect to acceptance by the public of
beneficially using biosolids."
WEF did produce some of the Biosolids Fact Sheets. The implication is that they were reviewed and approved by a
long list of people including some who were the subject of a fact sheet. An example was number 2 on the EPA's list to
debunk, Linda Zander. While the fact sheet was sent to Zander for a response, the fact sheet ignored her response
and the damage to family and dairy farm. The Zander family also had verified neurological damage from sludge. In a
1998 published neurological study, Neurotoxicity from municipal sewage sludge. Archives of Clinical
Neuropsychology,14, 160; Singer, R. (1998).Dr. Raymond Singer found that:
"This complex substance poses a significant neurotoxic threat to farmers, their workers, nearby residents,
and possibly to the general population through the food supply."
Singer's conclusion was that, "Municipal sewage sludge poses a measurable neurotoxic hazard to nearby
residents and farm workers, who need to be informed of possible neurotoxic injury from their exposure,
and then monitored using repeated neurobehavioral tests."
This was Perception Management at its worse. But the sludge industry had a major problem.
According to documented evidence, on February 22, 1993, two State Department of Ecology
Representatives, Al Hanson, and Kyle Dorsey, four King County Metro representatives, Mark Lucas, Carol
Ready, Steve Gilbert, Dan Sturgill and their legal counsel, Salley Tenney, of the Metro Legal Services, Mel
Kemper of the City of Tacoma, Hal Thurston, an attorney representing the cities that were involved in the
Zanders' lawsuits and four individuals also associated with the Zander law suit, met in a closed meeting to
discuss the Zander Case.
According to Keith A. Bode, as recorded in the Zander Action Summary, the legal cost to stop her will
exceed $500,000 dollars. Bode warned those in attendance at the meeting that Zander had to be stopped.
He said that she had identified 18 medical experts (including physicians, immunologists, toxicologists, and
nutritionists), 9 veterinarians, 2 property valuation/devaluation experts, 3 soil/hydraulic/geologic experts
and 1 testing lab who would testify about the dangers of sewage sludge use to humans and animals. Bode
warned that there would be extra-regional impact and "This action must not be settled". He reminded those
present:
The public persona of biosolids is precarious, at best, and each member of WEF and AMSA can be
assured that Zander appears dedicated to capitalizing on every available opportunity to publicize her
scare story...and remember, with respect to land application, the farming community comprises less than
2% of the population, so she need only reach a narrow population to cripple land application. It is essential
that her soapbox be removed and her credibility challenged before our regional problem has any more
effect (than she has now) nationally or internationally on land application of biosolids.
When you get sludge regulators and lawyers ganging up on a farmer, the farmer doesn't have much of a chance.
However, farming is a very dangerous occupation and farmers are not as dumb as the sludge experts expected. As the
sludge experts have discovered its hard to intimidate an old farmer once he/she has little left to lose, even if they file a
complaint with the Capitol police claiming his emails are terrorizing the EPA . In fact when they are lied too, see the
legal system misused and abused, they tend to get a little upset. Farmers expect fair play. They expect to be able to
make a decision to protect their investment and family based on honest information. EPA's sludge program has never
offered that option because EPA doesn't know what toxic materials are in sludge, nor do the states who issue permits
which opens the farmer up to common law lawsuits. For these reason Linda Zander created Help for Sewage Victims
and I joined her in 1991. The paper, Sludge Disposal: Sanitary Landfill-Open Dump-Superfund Site was
presented in September 1992 and published by the New Mexico Environmental in February 1993. The same month
Part 503 was published. The purpose of Help for Sewage Victims was/is to gather history and scientific documentation
of the dangers of sewage sludge exposure and make that information available to interested parties. State environment
officials are interested parties who could be victims of Perception Management just as well as farmers and their
neighbors. The problem is that they also could look like fools in court for following EPA's lead. After all as EPA has
indicated it is the state officials responsibility to know the laws.
What all this really means that the millions of dollars spent on agroterrorism prevention programs are for show. Just a
part of the Perception Management program to make folks feel safer. No one in government wants to admit the toxic
nature of sludge would place it within the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002;. Under the terrorism
laws, "Biological agent means any microorganism (including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or
protozoa), or infectious substance, or any naturally occurring, bioengineered, or synthesized component of any such
microorganism or infectious substance, capable of causing death, disease, or other biological malfunction in a human,
an animal, a plant, or another living organism; deterioration of food, water, equipment, supplies, or material of any
kind; or deleterious alteration of the environment." "Toxin means the toxic material or product of plants, animals,
microorganisms (including, but not limited to, bacteria, viruses, fungi, rickettsiae, or protozoa), or infectious substances,
or a recombinant or synthesized molecule, whatever their origin and method of production, and includes any poisonous
substance or biological product that may be engineered as a result of biotechnology, produced by a living organism; or
any poisonous isomer or biological product, homolog, or derivative of such a substance."
There was good reason for the hesitation by the federal BLM. EPA went back to the National Academy of Science for
support of the sludge program. While the sludge experts claimed they got the support for the sludge program, that was
not true.
The National Academy of Science 's (NAS) 2002 Committee report on Toxicants, Biosolids Applied to Land
Advancing Standards and Practices, states, "The NRC and the committee are aware that some interested parties
were anticipating that this report might make a determination of whether EPA should continue to promote land
application of biosolids. However, such a determination was not part of the committee’s charge." "Nor was the committee
asked to judge the adequacy of the individual standards in protecting human health."
The NRC Committee acknowledged that sludge is a very hazardous mixture of pathogens and chemicals with no
scientific possibility of creating a creditable risk assessment. However, this damning information was spread throughout
the 346 page document:
EPA considered a spectrum of bacteria, viruses, protozoa, and helminths in
setting its 1993 pathogen standards. New information on some of these and
other organisms are now available for updating hazard identification. Humans
may be exposed to pathogens in biosolids from ingestion of contaminated food,
water, or soil; dermal contact; and inhalation of bioaerosols (aerosolized
biological particles). There is also the potential for humans to be exposed via
secondary transmission from exposure to pathogens shed from infected
individuals either by direct contact or by routes through the environment. Some
exposure pathways, such as the inhalation pathway, were not adequately
evaluated by EPA in the development of the 1993 Part 503 pathogen
requirements. EPA also did not address sufficiently the potential for surface
water contamination by runoff, groundwater contamination, and secondary
transmission of disease.
Recent EPA guidance recommends that risk assessment of
complex mixtures ideally be based on studies of the mixture rather than on
selected individual components. Such an approach is not feasible for biosolids,
however, because studies of biosolids as complex mixtures are lacking.
Furthermore, although methods for conducting risk assessments of chemical
mixtures are available, no work has been done on risks from pathogen mixtures,
much less chemical-pathogen mixtures.
It is a challenge to integrate the outcomes of each agent-specific risk assessment into a comprehensive
whole, even for simple mixtures. One reason for the difficulty is the lack of information usually available on
the biological interactions between components of the mixture. The second reason is the challenge to
characterize in a useful way the range of risks that might occur. For biosolids, the possible adverse
outcomes of exposure will include acute and chronic effects from chemical exposures and principally acute
effects from exposures to pathogens. Further, these effects will range from short-term non-life-threatening
outcomes like irritation and diarrhea to chronic life-threatening outcomes like cancer. Although the
exposure-assessment component of the risk-assessment process will characterize the extent of various
chronic versus acute hazards for specific population groups, an integrated assessment will sometimes be
needed to balance the risk of outcomes of modest severity with those of great severity.
It is important to note that, even if a summary index of the risk of an adverse response to mixtures was
available, it would not necessarily reflect the total hazard of exposure to biosolids because of the inability
to identify all of its hazardous constituents and their potential for interaction in vivo. Moreover, the
composition of biosolids is susceptible to unanticipated changes from time to time and place to place.
Thus, it is not possible to conduct a risk assessment for biosolids at this time (or perhaps ever) that will
lead to risk-management strategies that will provide adequate health protection without some form of
ongoing monitoring and surveillance.
This situation led the committee to conclude that although the Part 503 agent-specific risk-assessment
process can be improved with new risk assessment methodology, the remaining uncertainty for complex
mixtures of chemicals and biological agents is sufficient to preclude the development of risk-management
procedures based on these agent-specific analyses that can reliably result in acceptable levels of risk.
The scientific statement is very blunt: FINDINGS,"-----the remaining uncertainty for complex mixtures of chemical and
biological agents is sufficient to preclude the development of risk-management procedures that can reliability result in
acceptable levels of risk."
In effect, the Committee agrees with part 503.9(t) that due to the multitude of chemicals, pathogens and radioactive
material, EPA’s waste disposal policy could be killing more people than the law allows.
Insurance liability for sludge sites has been a concern for bankers since 1993. "According to Dennis Connolly, an
insurance advisor to the .National Farm Credit Council, "— the industry views these risks with "a somewhat poisoned
eye," since it recently paid out over a billion dollars in liability claims for damages from asbestos, a product the
government once considered safe and even promoted to enhance energy efficiency."
An example is a Missouri lawsuit won by Ed Roller concerning sludge runoff and dead dairy cattle. The court said,
"Rollers' second amended petition predicated liability against Sparta on three theories: negligence (Count I); res ipsa
loquitur (Count III); private nuisance (Count IV). "Upon examining Rollers' second amended petition, CIE determined two
exclusions in Policy 3044, each independently of the other, barred coverage for Sparta against Rollers' claim."
"POLLUTION HAZARD EXCLUSION" 'pollution hazard' means an actual exposure or threat of exposure to the corrosive
toxic or other harmful properties of any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal pollutants, contaminants, irritants or toxic
substances, including smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acid or alkalis, and waste materials consisting of or containing any
of the foregoing." "the Absolute Pollution Exclusion bars coverage because Rollers' second amended petition pleads
damage "from the spreading of toxic substances, thereby fitting squarely within the Absolute Pollution Exclusion . . .
which excludes coverage for damages arising out of a pollution hazard, which includes the exposure to toxic
substances." (FN3)"
The following reference was cited by the court , City of Salina, Kansas v. Maryland Casualty Co. , 856 F.Supp. 1467 (D.
Kan. 1994).
The court began by determining whether the wastewater was a pollutant. Id. at 1478. After
an exhaustive discussion of the properties of the wastewater -- which had a pH (FN5) of at
least 12 -- the court concluded it was a pollutant as defined in the exclusion. Id. at 1478-79.
The court explained that a substance with a pH of at least 12 is hazardous to individuals who
come into contact with it. Id. at 1478. Consequently, it was an "irritant or contaminant" within
the meaning of the exclusion. Id. Furthermore, the exclusion explicitly listed "alkalis" as a
specific type of "irritant or contaminant," and the wastewater contained sodium hydroxide, an
alkali. Id. Consistent with those conclusions, the court held the "pollution exclusion " applied,
barring the claim from coverage. Id. at 1479.
Lime stabilization raises the pH to 11 or 12 and is one of the methods used on Class B sludge biosolids for agricultural
use as a fertilizer. Lets not forget that in 1973 John Walker found that lime only inactivated Salmonella for about 30
days. Yet, raising the pH to 12 is one of the approved methods of creating Class A sludge biosolids which have no
contact restrictions. There was an added danger the so called metals experts fail to consider, raising the pH to 11-12
converted chromium 3 to the deadly cancer causing hexavalent chromium 6.
Apparently the sludge metals experts have never done any basic research or they would have found that
hexavalent chromium (Cr-VI) is almost exclusively manmade. Natural occurring chromium is in the trivalent
(Cr-III) form. Hexavalent chromium has been found in glue, cement, detergents and other materials
including chromite ore. It is/was used in the chrome plating, corrosion inhibitors, dye, graphic art supplies,
fungicides, lithography solutions, paper matches, paint pigment manufacturing, wood preservation and the
leather industry.
Hexavalent chromium is produced by three methods, high-lime, low-lime, and lime-free processes. In 1975,
most of the chromite ore came from the Republic of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the USSR. No
chromite ore has beenmined in the United States since 1961.
In the study, A High-Level Disinfection Standard for Land-Applied Sewage Sludges (Biosolids)
David K. Gattie and EPA's David L. Lewis found:
Our laboratories investigated public complaints and concluded that irritant chemicals associated with
volatile chemicals and dusts blowing from treated land (e.g., bacterial toxins, lime, organic amines) may
cause nearby residents to be more susceptible to infections (Lewis et al. 2002, Lewis and Gattie 2002).
In the study, Interactions of pathogens and irritant chemicals in land-applied sewage sludges (biosolids)
EPA's David Lewis, et al., found:
Affected residents lived within approximately 1 km of land application sites and generally complained of
irritation (e.g., skin rashes and burning of the eyes, throat, and lungs) after exposure to winds blowing
from treated fields. A prevalence of Staphylococcus aureus infections of the skin and respiratory tract was
found. Approximately 1 in 4 of 54 individuals were infected, including 2 mortalities (septicaemia,
pneumonia). This result was consistent with the prevalence of S. aureus infections accompanying diaper
rashes in which the organism, which is commonly found in the lower human colon, tends to invade irritated
or inflamed tissue.
There have been a lot of sludge industry studies using your tax dollars claiming to prove sludge biological solids
(biosolids) use is safe. However, these sludge experts appear to have no scientific background or research to support
the claim and place too many limitations in the studies to be creditable. They also claim coliform and fecal colifom are
not pathogens. They don't appear to understand that fecal coliform used to assure the safety of sludge are mutant
thermotolerant strains of the Enterobacteriaceae family of bacteria.
The Introduction To Clinical Microbiology, University of Texas - Houston Medical School, describes
coliform as the "Enterobacteriaceae family have earned a reputation placing them among the most
pathogenic and most often encountered organisms in clinical microbiology. They are the causative
agents of such diseases as meningitis, bacillary dysentery, typhoid, and food poisoning."
Furthermore, according to Kenneth Todar, University of Wisconsin-Madison Department of
Bacteriology, "The enterobacteriaceae include agents of food poisoning and gastroenteritis,
hospital-acquired infections, enteric fevers (e.g. typhoid fever) and plague. They also cause
infections in domestic, farm and zoo animals and include an important group of plant pathogens.
Their host range includes animals ranging from insects to humans, as well as fruits, vegetables,
grains, flowering plants, and trees." [now they are human pathogens]
These Enterobacteriacea (coliform) are estimated to be responsible for about 100,000 deaths each
year in the US, and account for about half of all the clinically significant bacteria isolated by hospital
[biosafety level 2] laboratories. Freezing does not destroy them -- whether in nature in the water, or
on frozen foods contaminated with the bacteria.
It is strange, but CDC's DEATHS / MORTALITY report for 2005 does not indicate that pathogens, much less coliforms
cause any deaths, heart disease, strokes, cancer, etc., but studies do. What most people do not know, and the
regulators do not want you to know, is that disease epidemics (including neurological epidemics) have exploded since
EPA started its hazardous waste dumping program.
Prior to Lewis' studies, the last EPA study that was creditable appears to have been EPA's Mark Meckes 1982 study
Effect of UV light disinfection on antibiotic-resistant coliforms in wastewater effluents. Meckes found:
Total coliforms and total coliforms resistant to streptomycin, tetracycline, or chloramphenicol were isolated
from filtered activated sludge effluents before and after UV light irradiation. Although the UV irradiation
effectively disinfected the wastewater effluent, the percentage of the total surviving coliform population
resistant to tetracycline or chloramphenicol was significantly higher than the percentage of the total
coliform population resistant to those antibiotics before UV iirradiation.
It has been recognized in Germany, at least since D. Strauch published the 1991 paper "Survival of pathogenic
micro-organisms and parasite in extreta, manure and sewage sludge", that" most pathogenic
agents can survive the treatment process" and the sewage treatment process causes some of the pathogenic disease
organisms to be absorbed or enclosed in faecal particles during the treatment process. "Therefore," according to
Strauch, "sewage sludge is rightly described as a concentration of pathogens." Strauch said "two groups of
researchers had found that pathogenic disease organisms will be taken up inside the food crops." Strauch concluded
in the report that, "In any case, the agricultural utilization of hygienically dubious sewage sludge poses a risk for the
whole national economy."
In a 1998 conversation, EPA's David Lewis explained the above process. "The problem of pathogen detection in
sludge, according to Lewis, "is that the sewage treatment process creates hard crusted sludge aggregates and only the
pathogens on the outside of the aggregates are measured by standard tests." He says that most of the microbes are
trapped inside the aggregates. When ultrasound was used to break open the sludge aggregates the trapped microbes
were revealed. In effect, it appears that the treatment processes hide most of the pathogens rather than destroying
them.
In 2006 WEF funded a study which found pathogen reactivation after sludge dewatering .Since that time they have
been trying to discredit the study. “Examination of Reactivation and Regrowth of Fecal Coliforms in Centrifuge
Dewatered, Anaerobically Digested Sludges”
“Basically, what happens is when you come out of digestion and go into a dewatering device, you have
one density of fecal coliform and then, immediately after dewatering, that level increases by one, two,
three, or four orders of magnitude,” said Matthew Higgins, associate professor in the Department of Civil
and Environmental Engineering at Bucknell University (Lewisburg, Pa.), and a principal investigator for the
WERF study.
Because the bacteria cannot reproduce that quickly, researchers have concluded that this phenomenon is
due to the reactivation of bacteria. That is, the fecal coliforms were always present in the samples but were
invisible to standard culturing methods until dewatering somehow spurred them to function fully.
In May 2006, University of Minnesota researchers published data showing that extremely high numbers of multi-
drug resistant bacteria in effluent (treated water) at high levels are being released into the environment from highly
efficient, award winning, sewage wastewater treatment plants. Researchers were very concerned when they found
extremely fast transfer of the drug resistant gene between bacteria in the treatment plant which confirmed EPA studies
from the 80s. .
We can now start to understand why are water supplies are contaminated as EPA noted in 1984. Real scientists are
starting to do legitimate studies and find the truth.
The courts and the states have supported the Perception Management program concerning EPA's policy regulation
Part 503 because it was falsely believed the regulation was supported by an environment law.. However, human and
animal deaths from farm exposure have drawn the attention of the public. Farms have been destroyed. Tough lawsuits
have been won. Sludge biosolds victims keep piling up. EPA scientists who question sludge use have been attacked by
the sludge experts -- in and out of EPA. Scientists have been caught creating fraudulent studies. A court has removed
qualified immunity from two EPA employees involved in the fraud.
The tide is turning as shown by the McElmurry lawsuit in Georgia. He won because the sludge was disposed of on the
farm under the solid waste rule part 257, it was hazardous, and the city and EPA lied:
(Excerpts)
"The evidence in the administrative record shows that the McElmurrays' land is contaminated and unfit for
growing food-chain crops . Plaintiffs maintain that they would have violated the law by planting crops,
putting human health and welfare at risk . The McElmurrays submit that the high mortality level
experienced by their dairy herd is proof of the dangers associated with planting food crops on their land
Brobst opined in a letter that the McElmurrays' land was not contaminated . AR 1230-1240 .
Robert Brobst, US EPA BIRT - Biosolids Incident Response Team) admitted that one of the McElmurrays'
fields contained about forty to fifty times the allowable lifetime loading level of cadmium.".
"Of particular concern, Hall noted that over ten percent of samples showed highly elevated cadmium
concentrations, at levels up to seven times the limits that had been established at some Superfund sites,
which were being remediated under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U .S .C . § 6901-6992k (2003)
"Other specific evidence showed that heavy metals were found at levels that were above the regulatory
limits on the McElmurrays' farm, making the land unfit for food grown for human consumption. On one
piece of property alone, antimony levels registered at 96.8 ppm, while the regulatory limit was 4 ppm.
Arsenic registered at 44 .2 ppm, more than twice the amount allowed by law . Cadmium was found at a
level of 6 .41 ppm, which was more than three times the level deemed safe under the law. Selenium
registered at 5 .4 ppm, although the cleanup standard provided under the law was set at 2 ppm. Thallium
was found at 51 .6 ppm on that particular piece of property, although the regulatory limit is 2 ppm.' AR
1801-03. The levels were similar on other parcels farmed by the McElmurrays. AR 1803-06 . 8
Moreover, Plaintiffs submitted evidence that the sludge contained hazardous levels of chlordane, and that
it was applied to their land from 1980 to 1985, even though it was banned in 1978 .
"At oral argument, the McElmurrays noted that the administrative record showed that Augusta's lab reports
demonstrated that PCBs were placed on their land at a level in excess of 5,000 ppm, even though the
allowable limit under EPA standards was 2 ppm. See 40 C .F .R . 257 .3- 5
"Other evidence indicates that City officials altered the spreadsheets in 1999 in an attempt to remove any
record of the application of hundreds of thousands of gallons of sludge to hundreds of acres on the
McElmurrays' farm. "
". Because Brobst concedes that his conclusion [that sludge used on the farm was safe] is based on
Augusta's unreliable, and to some extent, invented, data, Brobst's finding has little merit on its own ."
The next stage
The next sewage disaster is when the public finds out part of the foodborne illness actually come from reclaimed water
and our drinking water. Now scientists are focusing on pharmaceuticals in the Nation’s Water. That make me nervous
and should make the insurances companies nervous. It is bad for the economy, there are not enough drugs there to
kill the disease organisms in our drinking water that cause dental disease, heart disease, strokes, cancer, death, etc.
However, that is old news. Drugs were found in effluent from a Kansas City, Missouri treatment plant in 1976 and
feminization of fish was also noted.
Now things are really starting to heat up. Foodborne outbreaks costing a 100 million here and a 100 million there tend
to scare farmers and insurance companies. Congressional Hearings scheduled for next year tends to scare everyone.
Some are afraid Congress might actually insist that federal agencies enforce the laws rather than helping companies
violate the laws. Others are afraid Congress will give EPA more power, more people and throw more money at the
agency and it will become more aggressive in poisoning the public by deregulation. Currently, it appears Congress
rewards those companies, and people, who can do the most damage to public health or do the most damage to the
publics welfare and bank account. Hopefully, we are in for a change.
According to a 11/20/2008 article from Inside EPA Weekly Report --
INDUSTRY FEARS BIOSOLIDS SUITS AFTER COURTS REJECT EPA RULE DEFENSE reprinted in Environment
Data Sources webpage for Insurance Professionals. Federal courts have rejected the EPA's position that tort suits are
preempted by the Part 503 rule. The Industry lawyer working on his Perception Management strategy against victims
and their attorneys was quoted. He said, "These lawyers are not rational because they are in it for the money."
The reality is that legitimate attorneys are getting wise to the perception management tactics of the sludge industry.
There are safer alternatives than exposing the public to the chemicals and pathogens. Some within EPA have been
suggesting gasification plants since the 90s. Due to the liability many municipalities are now exploring clean energy
alternatives for sustainable sludge use.
Much of the material for this history was taken from our 1992 conference paper Sludge Disposal: Sanitary Landfill-
Open Dump-Superfund Site, the books 1996 Review of National Academy of Science's (NAS) 1996 literary review
report by its National Research Council (NRC) Committee : "Use of Reclaimed Water and Sludge in Food Crop
Production", the 1998 book Deadly Deceit, and the January 1997 to August of 2003. NATIONAL SLUDGE ALLIANCE
FACT SHEETS researched and co-written with Gail Bynum, Ph.D.
Other material was taken from our current documents and links on our websites
www.deadlydeceit.com
www.thewatchers.us
Additional History and Studies and news may be found at the following websites
www.sludgevictims.com
www.sludgefacts.org
www.sludgenews.org
